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COMMENTS
DIMINISHED CAPACITY: THE MIDDLE
GROUND OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
The mass murders, assassination attempts and terrorist
activities that have usurped recent headlines seem to have pro-
duced increased public concern over the issue of legal responsi-
bility. While conceding that people who take potshots at
presidents "must be crazy," the general public fears and resents
the possibility that soft-headed judges and jurors will not only
find the perpetrators of these crimes insane, but will also unleash
them to prey again upon the innocent.
Legal scholars realize that many of the fears expressed by
the lay public stem from a misunderstanding of the facts' as
well as ignorance of complexities which have baffled the legal
profession over the centuries. The fact that those who are found
not guilty by reason of insanity2 may be sent to a state mental
1. Public concern, the amount of time the police spend in detection and
investigation, the ratio of the number of police to the number of these
crimes, and the quantity of stories in literature and the drama that use
murder as a central theme all attest to the interest we have in homicide.
However, the television or literary mystery usually is concerned with the
relatively rare premeditated type of killing. Most homicides have typical
forms and are crimes of passion that arise from a world of violence.
The typical criminal slayer is a young man in his twenties who kills
another man only slightly older. Both are of the same race; if Negro,
the slaying is commonly with a knife, if white, it is a beating with fists
and feet on a public street. Men kill and are killed between four and
five times more frequently than women, but when a woman kills she
most likely has a man as her victim and does it with a butcher knife
in the kitchen. A woman killing a woman is extremely rare, for she
is most commonly slain by her husband or other close friend by a beat-
ing in the bedroom.
Wolfgang, A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide, in THE DEATh PENALTY
IN AMERICA 74-75 (H. Bedau ed. 1964).
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 26(2), (3) (West 1970). CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016
(West 1970) provides:
There are six kinds of pleas to an indictment or an information, or to
a complaint charging an offender triable in any inferior court:
6. Not guilty by reason of insanity.
A defendant who does not plead guilty may enter one or more of the
other pleas. A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of
insanity shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time
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facility3 for a period of time longer than they would have been
imprisoned had they not been found legally insane, 4 militates
against fears that the protection of society is being sacrificed.
Despite popular focus on the controversy over the insanity
defense, for the criminal practitioner other aspects of criminal
responsibility, such as diminished capacity,5 are far more impor-
tant. Recent development has left the traditional rigid test for
insanity virtually unchanged, whereas diminished capacity has
rapidly evolved into a formidible defense available in a variety
of fact situations. It is essential for the practitioner to be
familiar with diminished capacity in the broader, more theoreti-
cal perspective of criminal responsibility, as well as to have a
working knowledge of how the concept can be used in court. For
the defendant, the defense practitioner, and those who believe
present rules pertaining to criminal responsibility are too rigid,
the diminished capacity defense is a necessary mitigation of the
harsh insanity rule. On the other hand, for those primarily con-
cerned with the protection of potential victims, the diminished
capacity defense seems but a poor substitute for a well thought
out medical-legal dispositional system which would determine
of the commission of the offense charged; provided, that the court may
for good cause shown allow a change of pleas at any time before the
commencement of the trial. A defendant who pleads not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits the com-
mission of the offense charged.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1975) sets out the procedures to be followed
when a defendant pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity." This section further
provides for a bifurcated trial; that is, the issues of guilt and sanity are tried sepa-
rately with a presumption of sanity in the guilt phase of the trial. The defendant
found to be insane, unless totally recovered, shall be committed to a state hospital
for the criminally insane or similar facility. Section 1026(a) provides the pro-
cedure for release of a committed person from the state hospital. See also id.
§ 1027, discussed at note 13 infra.
3. Id. § 1026.
4. If the verdict of finding be that the defendant was insane at the time
the offense was committed, the court unless it shall appear to the court
that the defendant has fully recovered his sanity shall direct that the de-
fendant be confined in the state hospital for the criminally insane ....
A defendant committed to a state hospital shall not be released from
confinement unless and until the court which committed him, or the
superior court of the county in which he is confined, shall . . . find and
determine that his sanity has been restored.
Id.
Application by a defendant for release from the mental institution because
of restoration of sanity can not be made until the defendant has been committed
for not less than 90 days. If the court finds the defendant's sanity has not been
restored, the applicant cannot file a further application until one year has elapsed
from the date of hearing upon his last preceding application. Id. § 1026(a).
The possibility of indefinite or prolonged commitment should be viewed in
terms of the various maximum and minimum penalties provided for various homi-
cide offenses. _See note 136 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 46-69 infra for a discussion of the dimin-
ished capacity defense or Wells-Gorshen rule.
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what is to be done for, and how to distinguish, those persons com-
mitting crimes while suffering from an impaired mind.
This comment will deal with recent practical aspects of the
diminished capacity defense in light of (1) closely related de-
fenses such as insanity, unconsciousness, and unconsciousness
resulting from voluntary intoxication; and (2) traditional con-
cepts of criminal responsibility. Since this topic is broad, it will
be necessary to focus primarily on non-statutory offenses which
have developed through the use of the diminished capacity
defense, with particular attention to homicide.6
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The classical test for dealing with the criminal responsibility
of the mentally impaired defendant was developed over a cen-
tury ago in M'Naughten's Case.7 The rule, as framed by a recent
commentator, states:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must
be clearly proved, that at the time of the committing of the
act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
8
One author has accounted for the M'Naughten rule by point-
ing out that it developed "at a time when there was widespread
belief in witchcraft and demonology on the part of many edu-
cated and knowledgeable persons."9  Modern psychology had not
developed to the stage where it offered a useful alternative to
traditional legal concepts of criminal responsibility.
The M'Naughten rule clearly lacks any subtlety whatever.
However, its simplicity-that is, its ability to be understood by
jurors-may well be the key to its longevity as the majority test
for legal insanity. As is typical of simplistic formulas, the
M'Naughten rule attempts to draw a clear-cut dichotomy be-
tween persons who are sane and those who are insane. With only
minor modifications to the cognitive element,'" the California
6. The diminished capacity defense may be used to negate the specific intent
required for crimes other than homicide; however such instances are rare. See
People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); Note, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw.
349 (1972).
7. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
8. Cooper, Diminished Capacity, 4 LOYOLA U.L.A.L. Rv. 308, 310 (1971).
9. Id. at 309.
10. The word "know" in the M'Naughten test has traditionally been given a
very narrow interpretation. California has broadened its own version of the test
by requiring that the defendant "know and understand." See note 11 infra. Con-
current with the strict M'Naughten line of development in California, a second
1975].:
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test for insanity is substantially the same as the M'Naughten test
set out above. The California test is summarized in the following
widely-used definition:
Legal insanity . . . . means a diseased or deranged condition
of the mind which makes a person incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and quality of his act, or makes a
person incapable of knowing or understanding that his act was
wrong."
In both the traditional M'Naughten and the California for-
mulations of the rule, the test for insanity is two-pronged.12
If the jury finds that a defendant is incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and quality of his act, or is incapable
of knowing and understanding that his act was wrong, it must
find that he is legally insane. 3
Certainly, equal application of the insanity test is desirable;
however, the lack of operational definitions for the conceptual
terms used in the California test forecloses any possibility of
equal application of the insanity defense to similarly situated
series of decisions has expanded the cognitive elements (knowledge and under-
standing) to include the "appreciative" capacity of the defendant, thus placing
"equal emphasis . . . upon the emotional dimension in the psychiatric integration
of the human personality." Student Symposium on the Proposed Criminal Code:
Insanity, Intoxication, and Diminished Capacity Under the Proposed California
Criminal Code, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 550, 553, (1972). The seminal decision in
this line of development is People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40
Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
11. COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIM-
INAL No. 4.00 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as CALJIC].
Supplementing this definition, CALJIC No. 4.00 also requires that the jury focus
its inquiry on the defendant's sanity or insanity "at the time of the commission
of the offense." However, evidence of the defendant's mental condition before
or after the commission of the offense is to be considered "for the purpose of
throwing light upon his mental condition as it was when the offense was com-
mitted." Id.
12. Although California clearly uses an either-or approach, most jurisdictions
assume that the requirement of "knowing the nature and quality of the act" adds
nothing to the right and wrong test. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 380 (2d ed. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK eds. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as ABF STUDY].
13. Id. Even a perfunctory reading of the M'Naughten test or any of its
derivative terms leaves the reader with the impression that the test lacks any real
possibility of consistent application. The test uses a multitude of conceptual terms(e.g., "knowing," "understanding," "nature and quality of acts," and "wrong")
without giving any indication of how these terms are to be applied. Accordingly,
those persons approaching the concepts of sanity and insanity with a background
in psychiatry, psychology, and sociology-sciences in which operationalization of
conceptual terms is crucial-find the legal definition of insanity at best useless,
and generally abhorrent. ABF STUDY, supra note 12, at ch. 11; S. GLUECK, LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? 21-22 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as GLUECK]; M. GUTTMACHER, M.D., THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW
ch. 3 (1968).
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defendants tried before different juries.' 4 In the absence of
psychiatric testimony, the test probably does little more than
allow jurors to make a moral judgment, based on lay definitions
of the terms in the test, as to whether or not the defendant
should be criminally responsible for his acts. However, when
jurors are confronted with expert psychiatric testimony,"
which is often based upon psychological operational definitions,
confusion is the probable result despite the apparent simplicity of
the formulation.16 Confusion is inevitable when jurors, lawyers
and psychiatrists all operate from different underlying premises.
A great deal of the bickering between the legal and psycho-
logical professions over a definition of insanity is mooted by the
realization that psychiatrists and lawyers have different reasons
for examining a defendant-patient's mental state. One author has
aptly summarized the differences in these underlying purposes
as follows:
Psychiatry evaluates individual behavior with the aid of
standards of the most general and flexible nature such that
each individual may receive special consideration for his
unique characteristics. The inherent vagueness and lack of
predictability in such a method of evaluation is foreign to the
necessity, in making legal judgments about individual be-
havior, that a standard of evaluation be uncomplicated and
uniform. 17
The author then turned, in typical legal commentator's style, to
criticize the present state of psychiatry:
Until the psychiatric science progresses to a degree of sophis-
tication which would assure precise and universally accepted
techniques of diagnosis and treatment, extensive incorpora-
tion of psychiatric thought and language in a legal standard
14. See GLUECK, supra note 13, at 45-47; Comment, A Punishment Rationale
for Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 561, 567 (1971).
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1027 (West 1972). This section requires, upon a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity, that the court select and appoint at least two
psychiatrists to "examine the defendant and investigate his sanity." The court
may in its discretion appoint a third psychiatrist. This section further provides
that "[n]othing contained in this section shall be deemed or construed to prevent
any party to any criminal action from producing any other expert evidence as to
the sanity of the defendant .... ." The inevitable result, therefore, in each case
where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, is that a parade of
psychiatrists march before the jurors to translate, if they can, their psychologically
defined terms into the appropriate legalese.
16. The controversy over what definition of insanity is to be used has taught
us that "[t]he test must be couched, as far as possible, in such familiar terms
as to be an understandable and helpful guide to the average law jury." GLUECK,
supra note 13, at 42.
17. Comment, A Punishment Rational for Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.LA.
L. REV. 561, 571 (1971) (citation omitted).
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does not promise to aid legal judgments without at the same
time forfeiting important goals of the legal system.
... The purposes of the psychiatric and legal disciplines
are different--one to diagnose and cure, the other to seek fact
and assess responsibility-and it is therefore incongruous to
base legal consequences directly on psychiatric conclusions.' 8
Psychiatrists have not hesitated to reply in kind. The late
Manfred S. Guttmacher, M.D., characterized the problem as a
creation of the legal profession. Quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
he charged:
The history of legal procedure is the history of the rejection
of reasonable and civilized standards in the administration of
law by most eminent judges and leading practitioners. 19
Guttmacher suggested that resistance on the part of the legal
profession to liberalized definitions of responsibility is based
upon the fact that "many lawyers and legislators are reaction-
ary. 20 The good doctor even diagnosed lawyers' resistance to
change as being a "neurotic phobia."'"
Criticisms of the traditional legal approach to criminal
responsibility have generated responses ranging from experimen-
tal revisions of the M'Naughten test to its total abolition.22 As
18. Id.
19. GUTTMACHER, supra note 13, at 29, citing TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ROYAL
COMMISSION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 582, 1950 (re-
marks of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter).
20. GUTTMACHER, supra note 13, at 29.
21. Id. One almost wonders to what extent such a mental defect-that is,
"neurotic phobia"- would mitigate the degree of criminal responsibility imposed
upon those of our legal brothers who go astray of the law. Consider the following
psychological discussion:
Neuroses . . . develop in individuals predisposed by their constitutional
makeup, or, what seems even more important, by their early childhood
environment and training, when they encounter emotionally charged sit-
uations with which they cannot cope.
H. WEILHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 17 (1954). Even
the novice attorney would try to bootstrap testimony of this type into an insanity,
unconsciousness, or diminished capacity defense. The illustration should make
the reader aware of the types of problems which inevitably result from an attempt
to fit legal and psychological definitions together.
22. Abandoning the insanity defense altogether is a solution that has had
many proponents, past and present. Dr. William A. White in 1911 suggested that
the jury's duty be confined to determining whether the accused was the
true transgressor. If he was so found, the state would take charge of
him. When insanity had been alleged he was to be sent to the nearest
competently staffed state hospital for its determination and if found to
be suffering from a mental disease he would remain there; if not, he
would be returned for sentencing.
GUTrMACHER, supra note 13, at 93. For a brief discussion both of critics who
have suggested the abolition of the insanity defense and critics who have suggested
revising or modifying the M'Naughten test, see ABF STUDY, supra note 12, at ch.
11; GLUECK, supra note 13 at -.
[Vol. is
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yet, none of the various suggested tests has impressed the legal
and psychiatric communities as a mutually acceptable, viable
replacement for the M'Naughten standard.23
The existence of the insanity defense, and the unsatisfactory
nature of the test, have created a number of practical diffi-
culties in the development of California criminal law. The
M'Naughten test dichotomizes: the only available categories are
"sane" and "insane." The state gives legal effect to the M'Naugh-
ten test by accepting legal insanity as a complete defense to any
crime.2 4 California Penal Code section 26(3) provides that the
defendant found to be insane is incapable of committing a
crime.25
The all-or-nothing approach of the insanity defense has been
further rooted in California criminal law by the procedures pro-
vided for invoking it. The California legislature has created a
bifurcated trial when the issue of sanity is raised by a defend-
ant.26 Assuming the court finds the defendant sane for the pur-
pose of standing trial,27 he may plead both "not guilty" and "not
guilty by reason of insanity. '28  The effect of the concurrent
pleas is that the defendant is first subjected to a trial which de-
termines guilt or innocence.29 At the guilt phase, the defendant
is "conclusively presumed" to be sane30 and evidence of insanity
is not generally admissible.3" If the defendant is found guilty
(or pleads only "not guilty by reason of insanity"), a second hear-
23. See ABF STUDy, supra note 12, at ch. 11. See also People v. Kelly, 10
Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973) (Mosk, J., concurring),
and I B. WITIN, CALIFORNIA CIMES §§ 139-40 (1975 Supp.).
24. CAL. PEN. CODE § 26(2), (3) (West 1970).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1026 (West Supp. 1975).
27. A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while he is men-
tally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of
this chapter if, as a result of mental disorder, he is unable to understand
the nature of the proceedings taken against him and to assist counsel
in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.
Id. § 1367. See id. §§ 1368.1, 1369 (West Supp. 1975) for procedures involved
in determining competency to stand or continue trial. When there is a finding
that the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, he is committed to a
state mental hospital until such a time as the defendant regains his mental com-
petency. See also id. §§ 1370, 1370.1.
28. Id. § 1016 (West 1970).
29. Id. § 1026 (West Supp. 1975).
30. Id.
31. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 310, 350-51, 202 P.2d 53, 66 (1949);
People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 P. 767 (1928); Cooper, Diminished Capacity,
4 LOYOLA U.L.A.L. REV. 308, 310-313 (1971). Two factors have attenuated the
effect of the bifurcated system: (1) the development of the Wells-Gorshen rule
(see text accompanying notes 46-69, infra); (2) the development of judicial ex-
ception, allowing the guilt and sanity issues to be tried together (see note 37
in! ra).
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ing is held solely to determine the issue of sanity. 2 The proce-
dural story comes to an end, for our purposes, when the defend-
ant is found sane at the time the crime was committed, and is
sentenced as provided by law; 3 or is found insane, in which case
the court must determine whether he is still insane and should
be placed in a state mental facility, or whether he is sufficiently
recovered to be released. 4
The bifurcated trial, sometimes called a prosecutor's tool
because evidence of insanity is excluded from the guilt phase, has
received almost as much criticism as the test which it is supposed
to implement."5 Since the insanity hearing may be before a dif-
ferent jury than the one trying guilt, 6 it may happen that
neither of the juries is permitted to deal with the defendant's
mental condition as an integral part of the circumstances behind
the particular crime involved. 7
32. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1975).
33. A misconception exists as to what is meant when a defendant is "sen-
tenced as provided by law." It is often assumed that a defendant found sane and
convicted will be sentenced to a facility like San Quentin, where treatment is not
available. Although this surely happens, it is not the inevitable result. For ex-
ample, in People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271(1964), although the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder by the
trial court, the judge recommended that he be placed in a hospital for the crim-inally insane. The identical result would have occurred had the jury found thedefendant insane. In this particular case the defendant was placed in a mental
facility for the criminally insane and remained there even though the California
Supreme Court reduced his conviction from first degree murder to second. It is
apparent that both the trial court and the Supreme Court of California attempted
to compensate for the inherent weaknesses in the California test for and defense
of insanity.
34. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1975).
35. ABF STUDY, supra note 12, at 398-99. See also note 37 infra.
36. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1975).
37. Probably because much psychiatric testimony can now be brought in
under the Wells-Gorshen rule (see notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra),
the parties to a trial may waive their right to a bifurcated trial on the separate
issues of guilt and insanity. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1975). In the
event of waiver, counsel argues each issue separately and the jury brings in sepa-
rate verdicts. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 568, 516 P.2d 875, 877, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 171, 173 (1973). Witkin, discussing the precedent for such a bilateral
waiver, concludes:
The odd result of these decisions is that (a). in a court trial, the statute
may be disregarded by stipulation or acquiescence, and (b) in a jurytrial, disregard of the statute by stipulation or acquiescence is either
proper, or, if improper, is nonprejudicial error.
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 502 (1963). An important re-
cent development attenuating the requirement of a bifurcated trial was suggestedin People v. Williams, 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 53, 99 Cal. Rptr. 103, 118 (1971).
Here, the evidence as well as the psychiatric definition of the defendant's condi-
tion, indicated that if the jury found that the condition (psychomotor epilepsy)
had existed at the time of the homicide, the defendant could have been legally
insane as well as unconscious of his actions. For a discussion of diminished
capacity and the unconsciousness defense, see text accompanying notes 42-137
infra.
The court suggested that, under these conditions, "it would have been provi-
19751 DIMINISHED CAPACITY
Without dwelling upon the classical battle between the legal
profession, with its commitment to concepts of free will and
human rationality, and the psychiatric profession, with its deter-
ministic tendencies, 3s this preliminary discussion should indicate
the difficulty of applying the M'Naughten test even-handedly,
and the consequent tendency towards rigid application.39 Lord
Bramwell, a supporter of the M'Naughten test, commented, "I
think that, although the present law lays down such a definition
of madness, that nobody is [ever] really mad enough to be within
it, yet it is a logical and good definition."4  Owing to the fact
that no definition of legal insanity had been found which miti-
gated the harshness of the M'Naughten test and satisfied the
basic premises of both the law and psychiatry, it became appar-
ent to defense practitioners that other approaches must be
developed to deal successfully with the mentally impaired crimi-
nal defendant.4 '
The remainder of this comment will explore the development
of a middle ground in criminal responsibility, focusing on the
practical application of the diminished capacity defense in homi-
cide cases.
dent to try the guilt and sanity issues together," and directed consolidation on re-
trial.
38. It is not the purpose of this comment to deal at length with the traditional
and continuing battle between the psychiatric profession and the legal profession;
however, a group of the issues central to the conflict is crucial to an in depth
understanding of the problem. The conflict is aptly capsulized as follows:
A basic ethical and psychological stumbling block in an analysis of cru-
cial problems of substantive Criminal Law and of sentencing policy is
the ancient enigma about whether man possesses "freedom of will" or
is instead the deluded plaything of deterministic forces completely and
always beyond his control.
GLUECK, supra note 13, at 5-6. For an excellent rebuttal to the accusations of
psychological determinism, see GUTrMACHER, supra note 13, at ch. 3.
39. GLUECK, supra note 13, at 45, citing ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 REPORT 75, states:
[The Commission], after long and penetrating study, recognized the
practical flexibility of the test by pointing out that "in cases where the
plea of insanity is disputed, the Rules may be strictly applied, [and] in
cases where their strict application would result in a manifestly unjust
verdict, they may be 'stretched' or even ignored.
People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964),
is a case in point as to the extreme degree of impairment required for and the
inflexibility of the California approach to the insanity defense. Extensive psychi-
atric testimony as well as evidence of highly abnormal behavior prior to the matri-
cide was offered with little contradiction. It is difficult to imagine any jury find-
ing the 15-year-old Wolff-allegedly severely schizophrenic-sane. However, the
nature of Wolff's disease, at least in the jury's opinion, did not meet the rigid
M'Naughten test. For a further discussion see GuTrMAcHER, supra note 13, at
27-28.
40. GUTTMACHER, supra note 13, at 26.
41. For a discussion of suggested tests which have been experimented with,
see ABF STUDY, supra note 12, at 386-92.
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II. THE MIIDDLE GROUND-DIMINISHED CAPACITY
[T]he law's sharp distinction between the wholly responsible
and wholly irresponsible is unjust, unrealistic, and contrary to
modern psychiatric assessment of mental pathology and be-
havioral capacity. 42
The California courts have marked out the parameters of the
middle ground, diminished capacity, on a case by case basis which
has ultimately resulted in judicial creation of a category of non-
statutory homicides.43
In People v. Danielly," a 1949 decision, the California
Supreme Court repeated the perennial complaint of psychiatrists,
commenting:
42. GLUECK, supra note 13, at 29. For years critics with psychiatric back-
grounds have suggested that the legal approach to criminal responsibility ignores
the complexities of the human mind, which obviously require recognition of a mid-
dle ground of criminal responsibility. See F. WHITLOCK, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 18 (1963).
43. CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1975) defines murder as "the unlaw-
ful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought" (emphasis
added). CAL. PEN. CODE § 188 (West 1970) deals with malice:
[M]alice may be express or implied. It is express when there is mani-
fested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow
creature. It is implied, when considerable provocation appears, or when
the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malig-
nant heart.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added) distinguishes the two
degrees of murder:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or ex-
plosive, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpe-
tration of, or attempt to perpetrate . . . [enumerated acts], is murder of
the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree.
The reader should view the statutory definition of malice aforethought with cau-
tion. For a thorough explication of the elements of murder, see People v. Conley,
64 Cal. 2d 310, 320-22, 411 P.2d 911, 917-19, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821-23 (1966).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 192 (West 1970) (emphasis added) provides in part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice.
It is of three kinds:
1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circum-
spection; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to acts com-
mitted in the driving of a vehicle.
See also California Penal Code section 20, which requires that "[i]n every crime
or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent,
or criminal negligence." In People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379,
461 P.2d 659 (1969), the California Supreme Court summarized the distinction
between murder and manslaughter as follows:
The unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is
murder . . . . If because of diminished capacity the perpetrator is un-
able to entertain malice but nevertheless if found to be able to form the
intent to kill the crime is voluntary manslaughter. If because of his
diminished capacity he additionally did not intend to kill, his crime, if
any, is involuntary manslaughter.
Id. at 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 386, 461 P.2d at 666 (emphasis added).
44. 33 Cal. 2d 362, 202 P.2d 18 (1949).
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Between the two extremes of sanity and insanity lies every
shade of disordered or deficient mental condition, grading
imperceptibly one into another . . . [and] there are persons
who, while not totally insane, possess such low mental powers
as to be incapable of the deliberation and premeditation
requisite to statutory first degree murder.
45
The court recognized that the existence of varying degrees
of mental illness requires the law to mitigate the harshness of
the all-or-nothing M'Naughten approach to criminal responsibil-
ity. In People v. Wells,4" decided on the same day as Danielly,
the court planted the seed which grew into the still-evolving con-
cept of diminished capacity.47 Wells was charged with assault
by a life convict. One of the elements of this offense is "malice
aforethought," similar to the mental state requisite for murder.
If found guilty, Wells was subject to the death penalty. a8  The
trial court had rejected Wells' attempt to introduce testimony by
physicians tending to show that the defendant suffered from an
abnormal physical and mental condition not amounting to insan-
ity at the time he attacked the guard. 9 The medical testimony
was offered not as a defense of insanity but rather to negate
the malice aforethought required to prove the charge.
The Supreme Court of California held that the evidence
should have been admitted on the issue of malice:
As a general rule, on the not guilty plea, evidence otherwise
competent, tending to show that the defendant, who at this
state is conclusively presumed sane, either did or did not, in
committing the overt act, possess the specific essential men-
tal state, is admissible, but evidence tending to show legal
sanity or legal insanity is not admissible.50
45. Id. at 388, 202 P.2d at 33, quoting Fisher v. U.S., 328 U.S. 463, 492
(1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
46. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
47. Fourteen years after Danielly and Wells, having observed the benefits de-
rived from the partial responsibility defense of diminished capacity, the court
stated:
It can no longer be doubted that the defense of mental illness not
amounting to legal insanity is a "significant issue" in any case in which
it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and effect are to ameli-
orate the law governing criminal responsibility practiced by the
M'Naughten rule .... This policy is now firmly established in the law
of California.
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 490-91, 386 P.2d 677, 682, 35 Cal. Rptr.
77, 82 (1963). The result of the court's recognition of partial responsibility has
been an increased reliance on psychiatric concepts and language in the application
of the diminished capacity defense. Comment, A Punishment Rationale for
Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1971). For a recent re-
finement of the diminished capacity defense, see Note, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 210
(1974).
48. People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 334, 202 P.2d 53, 56 (1949).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 350-51, 202 P.2d at 66.
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Ten years later, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed
Wells in People v. Gorshen.1 Gorshen, in front of a number
of witnesses including several police officers, shot and killed his
employer, with whom he had had an argument earlier in the even-
ing. The defendant had been drinking excessively prior to the dis-
pute with his boss, and had been taken to the hospital as a result of
the altercation. He told several people he was going to go home
and get a gun, which he did; he then returned and committed
the murder. The defense pointed to the defendant's intoxication
as well as to medical testimony evidencing that the defendant
was a "paranoic schizophrenic" and argued that, as a conse-
quence, the defendant had "acted almost as an automaton.r,2
The supreme court affirmed the second degree murder con-
viction, approving the trial court's finding that the defend-
ant's mental condition was sufficiently impaired only to preclude
willful and deliberate premeditation.5" However, in dictum,
while discussing the admissibility of testimony as to mental state,
the court indicated its willingness to overturn the line of cases
which suggested that such medical testimony was relevant only
to the degree of murder, and could not be used to negate malice
aforethought, thus reducing murder (which requires malice) to
manslaughter (which does not).54 In short, the court reasoned
that if, as in Wells, the malice aforethought required for assault
by a life termer could be negated by evidence of impaired mental
capacity, the same must be true with respect to the malice afore-
thought required for murder. 55
Known after Gorshen as the Wells-Gorshen rule, the partial
defense of diminished responsibility was further refined seven
years later in People v. Conley,5" and has since been referred
to as "diminished capacity."57
51. 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
52. Id. at 722-23, 336 P.2d at 495-96.
53. Id. at 720, 336 P.2d at 494.
54. Id. at 731-32, 336 P.2d at 502. Voluntary intoxication, according to an
early line of cases, can be considered on the question of the degree of the murder,
but is not to be considered on the question of whether the defendant is guilty of
murder or manslaughter. People v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794, 175 P. 6 (1918); People
v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 P. 481 (1901); People v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425,
30 P. 581 (1892).
55. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 728-34, 336 P.2d 492, 499-503
(1959).
56. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
57. Id. See generally Cooper, Diminished Capacity, 4 LOYOLA U.L.A.L. REV.
308 (1971); Student Symposium on the Proposed Criminal Code: Insanity, Intox-
ication and Diminished Capacity under the Proposed California Criminal Code,
19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 525 (1972); Comment, Keeping Wolff From the Door: Cal-
ifornia's Diminished Capacity Concept, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (1972); Com-
ment, A Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 561
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Prior to Conley, it was settled that the specific intent
required for first degree murder5s could be negated by evidence
which created a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's ability
to willfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly commit the homi-
cide.59 Generally, the evidence offered was of voluntary intoxi-
cation,6" mental illness,6 ' or both.6 2  Dictum in Gorshen fore-
shadowed the emergence of the full-blown diminished capacity
doctrine of Conley. The Gorshen court posed a question:
[Can] evidence of defendant's abnormal mental or physical
condition (whether caused by intoxication, by trauma, or by
disease, but not amounting to legal insanity or unconscious-
ness) . . . be considered to rebut malice aforethought and
intent to kill . . . where the prosecution evidence shows in-
fliction of a mortal wound for the purpose of killing and the
evidence does not show provocation which would meet the
law's definition of voluntary manslaughter . . . ?63
The question in substance was whether the California man-
slaughter statute54 provides or allows for other types of man-
slaughter than those specifically enumerated therein. Feeling
compelled to resolve this question, the Conley court concluded:
[A] finding of provocation sufficient to reduce murder to
manslaughter is not the sole means by which malice can be
negated and voluntary manslaughter established. A person
who intentionally kills may be incapable of harboring malice
aforethought because of a mental disease, defect, or intoxi-
cation, and in such case his killing, unless justified or ex-
cused, is voluntary manslaughter.6'
This was the official creation of what has been termed
(though without explicit court approval) non-statutory volun-
tary manslaughter.66 Evidently, the trial courts were slow to
(1971); Note, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 210 (1975); Note, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW.
349 (1972).
58. For elements of homicide, see note 43 supra.
59. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964);
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963);
People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33
Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
60. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
61. People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
62. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
63. Id. at 731, 336 P.2d at 501.
64. See note 43 supra.
65. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 318, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr.
815, 820 (1966) (emphasis added).
66. "Non-statutory manslaughter" aptly describes the result of a finding that
a defendant's mental capacities were so impaired as to negate the specific intent
for first degree murder (i.e., deliberation, wilfullness, and premeditation), as well
as the malice aforethought required for either degree of murder. In trying to
avoid the obvious criticism that the court was usurping a legislative prerogative
by creating non-statutory manslaughter, the court commented:
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recognize the judicially created category of "non-statutory man-
slaughter." Several cases indicate that when defendants relied
upon diminished capacity defenses, trial courts erred by instruct-
ing the jury in purely statutory terms (e.g., provocation), or
failing to instruct on manslaughter at all because of insufficient
evidence to support statutory manslaughter.6 7
Conley suggests that not only can a showing of diminished
capacity negate the element of malice so as to create non-statu-
tory voluntary manslaughter, but it can also negate the intent
to kill element required for voluntary manslaughter, thereby creat-
ing non-statutory involuntary manslaughter.68 Although the sug-
gestion in Conley seems clear, its applications have not been fully
explicated."9
A. Voluntary Intoxication
The most common case in which an involuntary man-
slaughter instruction is sought on diminished capacity grounds
involves a defendant who claims diminished capacity due to
voluntary intoxication.7 0  There has been great confusion as to
We thus gave effect to the statutory requirements for the offense of man-
slaughter, "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice," and
recognized that since the statute had been enacted before the concept of
diminished capacity had been developed, its enumeration of nonmalicious
criminal homicides did not include those in which the lack of malice re-
sults from diminished capacity. That enumeration could not be ex-
clusive, for the absence of malice a homicide cannot be an offense higher
than manslaughter.
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 318, 411 P.2d 911, 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
-820 (1966). While the supreme court has never used the phrase "non-statutory
involuntary manslaughter," it should be noted that the court has referred to volun-
tary manslaughter which results from the negation of malice as "non-statutory vol-
untary manslaughter." People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1969); People v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 449 P.2d 449, 74 Cal. Rptr.
385 (1969). See also People v. Cisneros, 34 Cal. App. 3d 399; 110 Cal. Rptr.
269 (1973); People v. Rodriguez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 487, 79 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1969); People v. Aubrey, 253 Cal. App. 2d 912, 61 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1967).
67. People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969);
People v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 449 P.2d 449, 74 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1969); People
v. Rodriguez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 487, 79 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1969); People v. Aubrey,
253 Cal. App. 2d 912, 61 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1967).
68. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 324-26 n.4, 411 P.2d 911, 920-21 n.4,
49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 824-25 n.4 (1966).
69. For a discussion of recent applications, see People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20,
533 P.2d 1017, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975); Note, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 210
(1974).
70. In People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1966), the court formulated a jury instruction specifically dealing with voluntary
intoxication negating intent to kill and thus resulting in non-statutory involuntary
manslaughter. The court suggested:
2. Involuntary manslaughter is a killing in the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a law-
ful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without
due caution and circumspection.
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the degree of intoxication required to negate intent to kill. 71
Until recently, it seemed well-established that voluntary intoxi-
cation must reach the level of legal unconsciousness before a
defendant is legally incapable of forming the necessary intent.7"
However, in April, 1975, the California Supreme Court held that
a defendant offering the defense of diminished capacity resulting
from self-induced intoxication need not show incapacity amount-
ing to legal unconsciousness in order to negate intent to kill.
73
As will be discussed in more detail later, unconsciousness is
ordinarily a complete defense to a charge of criminal homicide.
7 1
However, California Penal Code Section 22 suggests, in effect,
that if the state of unconsciousness results from intoxication,
voluntarily induced, it is not a complete defense. 75  This is now
thoroughly supported by case law. The court has held that even
where a defendant's diminished capacity from voluntary intoxi-
cation renders him incapable of achieving a particular state of
mind requisite to any offense, it may never excuse homicide.
71
Thus, if you find that the defendant killed while unconscious as a
result of voluntary intoxication and was therefore unable to formulate
a specific intent to kill or to harbor malice, his killing is involuntary
manslaughter. The law does not permit him to use his own vice as a
shelter against the normal legal consequences of his act. An ordinary
and prudent man would not, while in possession of a dangerous weapon,
permit himself to reach such a state of intoxication as to be unconscious
of his actions.
Id. at 325-26 n.4, 411 P.2d at 920-21 n.4, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25 n.4; accord,
People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969);
People v. Cisneros, 34 Cal. App. 3d 431, 110 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973); People v.
Roy, 18 Cal. App. 3d 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1971); cf. People v. Mosher, 1
Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969).
71. For a discussion of the degree of voluntary intoxication necessary to ne-
gate the intent to kill and thus reduce murder to non-statutory involuntary man-
slaughter, see People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 533 P.2d 1017, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1975), overruling People v. Roy, 18 Cal. App. 3d 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1971);
cf. People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969).
72. See People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1973); People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1969); People v. Roy, 18 Cal. App. 3d 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1971).
73. People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 28-29, 533 P.2d 1017, 1021, 120 Cal. Rptr.
377, 381 (1975).
74. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 26(5) (West 1970).
75. Id. § 22 provides:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication
is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But
whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or in-
tent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree
of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused
was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive, or in-
tent with which he committed the act.
76. People v. Tidwell, 3 Cal. 3d 82, 86, 473 P.2d 762, 764, 89 Cal. Rptr.
58, 60 (1970); People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 316, 455 P.2d 153, 161, 78
Cal. Rptr. 217, 225 (1969); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 323, 411 P.2d 911,
919, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 823 (1966); People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 515, 268
P.2d 705, 720 (1954).
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The rationale has been that where one's unconsciousness is the
result of his own act, the "requisite element of criminal negli-
gence is deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness, and a
defendant stands guilty of involuntary manslaughter . . .-.
Essentially, this stance reflects a policy judgment: courts have
determined that, in a homicide case, prior negligence is sufficient
culpability to warrant a finding of criminal responsibility despite
absence of the required mental state. Thus the key to a
diminished capacity defense based upon intoxication is to deter-
mine what is voluntary and what is not. In People v. Wyatt, 8
the court quoted the CALJIC instructions as correctly defining
voluntary " and involuntary8" intoxication. CALJIC No. 4.24
reads:
Intoxication of a person is voluntary if it results from his
willing partaking of any intoxicating liquor, drug or other sub-
stance when he knows that it is capable of an intoxicating
effect or when he willingly assumes the risk of that effect as
a possibility.8 '
The reader should note that this approved definition of "vol-
untary" is a very narrow one and is based upon nonoperational-
ized concepts such as were earlier discussed with respect to the
M'Naughten test. 82  As yet, California courts have been unwill-
ing to accept arguments based on the premise that intoxication
is involuntary if, due to chronic alcoholism, the defendant is
compelled to drink.8 3  However, when voluntary intoxication,
chronic or otherwise, leads to insanity, the court will accept it
77. In People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217(1969), the court formulated a jury instruction with regard to this implied crim-
inal negligence:
When a man voluntarily induces his own intoxication to the point of
unconsciousness, he assumes the risk that while unconscious he will com-
mit acts inherently dangerous to life and limb. Under the circum-
stances, the law implies criminal negligence.
Id. at 316-17 n.4, 455 P.2d at 161 n.4, 78 Cal. Rptr. 225 n.4 (emphasis added);
accord, People v. Tidwell, 3 Cal. 3d 82, 473 P.2d 762, 89 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1970);
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966); People
v. Wyatt, 22 Cal. App. 3d 671, 99 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1972); People v. Roy, 18 Cal.
App. 3d 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1971).
78. 22 Cal. App. 3d 671, 99 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1972).
79. CALJIC No. 4.22 (1970).
80. CALJIC No. 4.24 (1970) defines intoxication as involuntary "when it is
produced in a person without his willing and knowing use of intoxicating liquor,
drugs or other substance and without his willing assumption of the risk of possible
intoxication."
81. People v. Wyatt, 22 Cal. App. 3d 671, 99 Cal. Rptr. 674, 678 (1972),
citing CALJIC No. 4.22 (1970) (emphasis added).
82. See note 13 supra.
83. People v. Wyatt, 22 Cal. App. 2d 671, 677, 99 Cal. Rptr. 674, 678(1972); see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); cf. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal.
3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973).
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as a complete defense.8 4  In People v. Kelly, 5 the court held
that long-continued use of drugs or alcohol can produce a
condition which may constitute a complete defense if
[t]he mental disorder remains even after the effects of the
drug or alcohol have worked off. The actor is legally insane,
and the traditional justifications for criminal punishment are
inapplicable because of his inability to conform, intoxicated
or not, to accepted social behavior.
86
Although the court carefully pointed out that "policy considera-
tions" support a distinction in treatment between voluntary
intoxication resulting in unconsciousness and voluntary intoxica-
tion resulting in insanity, Kelly certainly seems to indicate a
liberalizing trend, in that culpability-or criminal negligence-
is not being implied based upon one's past voluntary indul-
gences. 87 Of course, the rub is that to constitute a defense these
indulgences must lead to a condition that meets the rigid
M'Naughten definition of insanity.
8
Some of the confusion surrounding the defense of dimin-
ished capacity due to unconsciousness arising from voluntary
intoxication can be attributed to various faulty interpretations
of People v. Mosher."9 In Mosher, the defendant offered evi-
dence of both unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication, and
unconsciousness or severe diminished capacity due to mental ill-
ness or defect.90 The Mosher court carefuly explicated non-
statutory involuntary manslaughter resulting either from uncon-
sciousness due to voluntary intoxication, or from mental defect or
illness. However, the editors of CALJIC in formulating an instruc-
tion which provided for non-statutory involuntary manslaugh-
ter91  excluded the requirement (clearly indicated by the
84. In People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 574-77, 516 P.2d 875, 881-83, 111
Cal. Rptr. 171, 177-79 (1973), the court held, "[W]hen insanity is the result of
long continued intoxication, it affects responsibility in the same way as insanity
which has been produced by any other cause." The only restrictions placed upon
this holding is that the insanity, temporary or permanent, must be of a "settled
nature." This would, therefore, exclude those cases in which the insanity resulted
solely from the taking of an intoxicating substance and no settled insanity is pres-
ent due to chronic use.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 576, 516 P.2d at 882, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
87. Compare People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr.
171 (1973) with notes 70, 75 and 77 supra.
88. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 576, 516 P.2d 875, 883, 111 Cal. Rptr.
171, 199 (1973).
89. 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969).
90. Id. at 386-89, 461 P.2d at 663-65, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85.
91. CALJIC No. 8.48 (1970) (emphasis added) stated in part:
There is no malice aforethought and intent to kill if by reason of
diminished capacity caused by mental illness, mental defect, or intoxica-
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discussion in Mosher) that voluntary intoxication must reach the
level of unconsciousness to negate the intent required for volun-
tary manslaughter. The California Court of Appeal, in People
v. Roy, 2 rectified the misinterpretation which had arisen from
Mosher by restating the rule that voluntary intoxication will
negate intent to kill only if intoxication is severe enough to
qualify as legal unconsciousness. This rule was consistently
applied until April, 1975, when the California Supreme Court
handed down a decision approving the original CALJIC position.
In People v. Ray,9" the California Supreme Court held:
The critical factor in distinguishing the degrees of a
homicide is thus the perpetrator's mental state. If a dimin-
ished capacity renders him incapable of entertaining either
malice or an intent to kill, then his offense is mitigated to
a lesser crime. Although a finding that the perpetrator was
unconscious would establish the ultimate facts that the perpe-
trator lacked both the ability to entertain malice and an intent
to kill, the absence of either or both of such may nevertheless
be found even though the perpetrator's mental state had not
deteriorated into unconsciousness.9 4
In Ray, the defendant had voluntarily taken drugs prior to
and after an altercation with his victim. 98 After taking a beat-
ing that resulted in temporary unconsciousness, Ray left the
scene, went home, and later returned with a gun which he
eventually used on his victim. 0  Although the lower court-
instructed the jury on first and second degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and the effect of diminished capacity with respect
to these offenses, it did not instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter. The trial court relied on those cases which denied
involuntary manslaughter instructions absent a showing of in-
toxication severe enough to constitute legal unconsciousness.9 7
While reaffirming the rule that voluntary intoxication resulting
tion, the defendant did not have the mental capacity to harbor malice
aforethought and to reform an intent to kill.
When CALJIC No. 8.48 (1970) is read in conjunction with CAILJIC No. 8.47(1970), which deals with involuntary manslaughter resulting from unconsciousness
due to voluntary intoxication, one is left with the impression that the former in-
struction refers to a state of voluntary intoxication other than unconsciousness
which might negate intent to kill. CALJIC 8.47 (1970) reads in part:If you find that the defendant killed while unconscious as a result
of voluntary intoxication and was therefore unable to form a specific in-
tent to kill or to harbor malice, his killing is involuntary manslaughter.
92. 18 Cal. App. 3d 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1971).
93. 14 Cal. 3d 20, 533 P.2d 1017, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
94. Id. at 28, 533 P.2d at 1021, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
95. Id. at 25, 533 P.2d at 1019, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
96. Id. at 24, 533 P.2d at 1018, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
97. See note 72 supra.
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in unconsciousness can never be a complete defense,98 the
supreme court held on appeal that a jury instruction on involun-
tary manslaughter must be given sua sponte whenever the
defendant's diminished capacity casts a reasonable doubt on his
ability to entertain intent to kill, even though there is no evi-
dence that impairment was serious enough to qualify as legal
unconsciousness. 9
B. Mental Illness or Mental Defect
Mosher spawned another line of non-statutory manslaughter
cases: those in which the defendant claims intent to kill was
negated by diminished capacity due solely to mental defect or
illness not amounting to legal insanity. However, drawing any
clear standard from Mosher is difficult, since the defendant
pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity;10 and he
offered defenses based on both diminished capacity due to mental
illness or defect, and diminished capacity resulting in unconscious-
ness arising from voluntary intoxication. The case involved so many
similar defenses that confusion was bound to result. Nonethe-
less, at least in dictum, Mosher established that it is possible to
negate intent to kill by a sufficient showing of diminished capa-
city due to mental illness or defect.' 01 In the 1971 revision, the
editors of CALJIC interpreted Mosher as standing for the propo-
sition that mental defect, mental illness or unconsciousness due
to voluntary intoxication could negate intent to kill, resulting in
non-statutory involuntary manslaughter. 10 2  However, when the
California Court of Appeal was confronted with the issue a year
later, the court, apparently ignoring Mosher, commented:
Neither counsel nor we have been able to find a case not
involving intoxication which holds that diminished capacity to
form an intent to kill can reduce homicide to involuntary
manslaughter. 10
3
In People v. Long,0 4 the California Court of Appeal was
squarely presented with the issue of whether intent to kill could
be negated by mental defect or illness, in the absence of evidence
of intoxication from any source. The court concluded:
While . . . there have been no cases directly involving
mental illness or mental defect, we can find no rational dis-
98. 14 Cal. 3d 20, 30 n.9, 533 P.2d 1017, 1023 n.9, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383
n.9 (1975).
99. Id. at 31, 533 P.2d at 1023, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
100. 1 Cal. 3d 379, 384, 461 P.2d 659, 662, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (1969).
101. Id. at 390, 461 P.2d at 666, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
102. CALJIC No. 8.48 (1974). See note 91 supra.
103. People v. Schindler, 23 Cal. App. 3d 369, 100 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1972).
104. 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1974).
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tinction between those situations and that of unconsciousness
resulting from voluntary intoxication. o5
Having established that intent to kill could be negated by this
type of diminished capacity, the court found no need to elabor-
ate on the quantum of evidence necessary to support the defense.
The court felt that since Long had admitted conscious intent to
kill, the evidence was so clearly insufficient to support a jury
instruction on non-statutory involuntary manslaughter that a
detailed discussion of the amount and type of evidence which
would justify an instruction was inappropriate. °6 In exercis-
ing proper judicial restraint, the court has left us in the dark
as to when and under what circumstances the Long defense
(diminished capacity due to mental defect or illness) could
negate the intent to kill required for homicide.
C. Application and Confusion
After Long, but prior to Ray, defense attorneys were left to
speculate whether the degree of impairment necessary to estab-
lish the Long defense based on mental defect or illness1 7
differs from that required to establish similar defenses such as
unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication. °8 People v.
Ray, which held that impairment caused by self-induced intoxica-
tion need not be severe enough to constitute unconsciousness in
order to negate intent to kill, 1 9 has added to the confusion over
the amount and type of evidence required for the various
defenses. Prior to Ray, it might reasonably have been presumed
that the showing of impairment required to satisfy the Long
defense would necessarily be less than that required to prove
unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication, since incapacity
due to mental disease or defect does not involve the element of
culpability attributed to self-induced intoxication.110  How-
ever, Ray demands that this view be altered. It now seems
reasonable to conclude that the degree of impairment sufficient
to negate intent to kill under the Long defense, and the amount
and type of evidence necessary to prove it, would also be suffi-
105. Id. at 686, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
106. Id. at 686, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35.
107. The phrase "Long defense" is merely this author's label for the partial
defense which involves an attempt to negate the intent to kill required for volun-
tary manslaughter by a showing of diminished capacity due to mental illness or
mental defect. If the Long defense is successful, the defendant can be convicted
of nothing greater than (non-statutory) involuntary manslaughter.
108. See Note, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 210 (1974).
109. See note 75 supra.
110. Note, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 210 (1974).
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cient to support the Ray defense (diminished capacity which
results from voluntary intoxication short of unconsciousness).
The Ray decision leaves two problems: (1) although it
appears that diminished capacity caused by mental illness, men-
tal defect and voluntary intoxication are all to be judged by the
same standard, we have no clear indication as to how serious the
impairment must be; and, (2) although we know that diminished
capacity severe enough to qualify as legal unconsciousness would
do no more than reduce murder to involuntary manslaughter in
the voluntary intoxication situation, we have no idea what effect
unconsciousness resulting from mental defect or illness would
have.
1. Comparison with unconsciousness. The second question
presented by Ray may usefully be explored, although not
answered, by understanding the defense of unconsciousness"'
and its possible relationship to the Long situation (diminished
capacity due solely to mental illness or defect). A good expla-
nation of the unconsciousness defense can be found in CALJIC
No. 4.30, which states:
Where a person commits an act without being conscious
thereof, such act is not criminal even though, if committed
by a person who was conscious, it would be a crime.
This rule of law applies only to cases of the unconscious-
ness of persons of sound mind, such as somnambulist or
persons suffering from the delirium of fever, epilepsy, a blow
on the head or the involuntary taking of drugs or intoxicating
liquor, and other cases in which there is no function of the
conscious mind.
1 12
It is well established that the difference between diminished
capacity and unconsciousness is one of degree only:
[W]here the former provides a "partial defense" -by negating
a specific mental state essential to a particular crime, the
latter is a "complete defense" because it negates capacity to
commit any crime at all. 1
3
Exploring this degree of difference is mandatory if the practi-
tioner is to apply skillfully the various defenses relating to
111. CAL. PEN. CODE § 26 (West 1970) states:
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to
the following classes:
5. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious
thereof.
112. CALJIC No. 4.30 (1970) (emphasis added). See People v. Kelly, 10 Cal.
3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973), for a good summary of un-
consciousness resulting from various causes.
113. People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 377, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 406
(1970).
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mental state or condition. Little difficulty arises in distinguish-
ing the Long-Ray partial defenses and the complete defense of
unconsciousness from diminished capacity resulting in uncon-
sciousness due to voluntary intoxication. As previously dis-
cussed, a defense based on voluntary intoxication involves an
implied element of criminal negligence"1 which significantly
distinguishes this type of unconsciousness from that unconscious-
ness which constitutes a complete defense. 1 5 Evidence that
voluntary intoxication produced unconsciousness establishes the
ultimate fact that the defendant lacked the ability to entertain
malice and intent to kill; whereas in the Long-Ray situation we
do not know what evidence will establish these ultimate facts.
Where evidence shows that diminished capacity due solely
to mental illness or defect is severe enough to approach legal
unconsciousness, substantial difficulty arises. In light of Ray,
the Long defense could not require a state of unconsciuosness
to negate intent to kill. But what is the result if uncon-
sciousness is established? In a footnote in People v. Roy, the
court unequivocally declared that a state of unconsciousness
produced by mental disease or defect would be a complete
defense. 1
There has been some question, however, as to the accuracy
of the footnote in Roy. Whether unconsciousness caused by men-
tal illness or defect is a complete defense to homicide probably
will depend upon the type of mental illness or defect involved,
and the strength of the evidence showing uncosciousness. The
statement in Roy should be carefully considered in terms of the
definition of the defense of unconsciousness set out correctly in
CALJIC No. 4.30.l7 That jury instruction limits the uncon-
sciousness defense to "persons of sound mind." When CALJIC
No. 4.30 specifies "somnambulist or persons suffering from
the delirium of fever, epilepsy, a blow on the head or the
involuntary taking of drugs or intoxicating liquor," does this
indicate that "sound mind" refers to those persons Whose uncon-
sciousness is not the product of any volitional act? Or does
"sound mind" refer to those persons who are "medically" of
sound mind? Does the catch-all phrase "and other cases in which
there is no function of the conscious mind" contemplate use of
a free-will rather than a medical definition of "sound mind"? At
this point, there are no clear-cut answers to these questions; how-
ever, further explication of the unconsciousness defense may help
114. See notes 75 & 77 supra.
115. See note I11 supra.
116. 18 Cal. App. 3d 537, 546 n.4, 95 Cal. Rptr. 884, 889 n.4 (1971).
117. See note 112 supra.
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the practitioner frame the appropriate arguments with respect
to these questions.
The California courts have interpreted "unconsciousness"
broadly, thus further complicating the task of drawing lines
between the defenses of unconsciousness and diminished capacity
due to mental illness or defect which is sufficient to negate intent
to kill. In People v. Newton, the California Court of Appeal
declared:
"[U]nconsciousness" ... need not reach the physical dimen-
sions commonly associated with the term (coma, intertia,
incapability of locomotion or manual action, and so on); it
can exist . . . where the subject physically acts in fact but
is not, at the time, conscious of acting.
1 8
Clarifying Newton, the court in People v. Heffington sug-
gested that unconsciousness "includes not only a state of coma
or immobility, but also a condition in which the subject acts
without awareness.""9  Some difficulty has arisen, however, in
the application of the Newton definition of unconsciousness. In
People v. Williams, the court modified the rule requiring the jury
to be instructed that "when a person acts as if he were conscious,
he is presumed to be conscious."' 20  In Williams the court was
directly confronted with unanimous expert testimony that the
defendant's psychomotor epilepsy could cause him to be uncon-
scious of his acts, although his lack of consciousness would not
be apparent to the lay person.12' The court of appeal found
that the Williams jury, told that conscious behavior raises a pre-
sumption of consciousness, could have interpreted this as direct-
ing them to ignore psychiatric testimony, in favor of a conclusive
legal presumption raised by a finding of councious-like 
acts.122
The court suggested that a fact-finding of conscious-like acts
raises only a rebuttable presumption which must be judged in
light of other evidence.
123
118. 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 376, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 405 (1970).
119. People v. Heffington, 32 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 107 Cal. Rptr. 859, 865
(1973). This case suggests that the defendant's recollection of what occurred will
be an important factor. Too much recollection can indicate awareness, so as to
preclude application of the unconsciousness defense; in addition, if the defendant
is too lucid as to the situation surrounding the alleged crime, it will probably be
taken as an indication that the defendant's mental impairment did not reach a
level that would negate intent to kill. Compare People v. Heffington, supra, and
People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974), with
People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1974).
120. 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 55-57, 99 Cal. Rptr. 103, 119-21 (1971). See com-
ment to CAIUIC No. 4.31 (1974).
121. 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 55-57, 99 Cal. Rptr. 103, 119-21 (1971).
122. Id.
123. Id.
1975]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
In Williams the court was forced to probe the boundaries of
the defenses of insanity, unconsciousness, and (severe) dimin-
ished capacity. Problems such as the "sound mind" limitation
and its effect on the various defenses were raised. For example,
Williams used both the unconsciousness defense and the Long
defense, which is exclusively based on diminished capacity due
to mental illness or defect. Thus, the expert testimony offered
necessarily tended to indicate lack of "sound mind." Is the
defense of unconsciousness, therefore, incompatible with the par-
tial defense of diminished capacity due to mental illness or defect
severe enough to negate intent to kill?
Unfortunately, the Williams court was able to skirt the issue
of whether the defendant was precluded from asserting the
unconsciousness defense solely because he also presented expert
testimony indicating he lacked a sound mind. The court merely
held that "psychomotor epilepsy" fell within the enumerated
examples in CALJIC No. 4.30, which includes epilepsy as a proper
condition for an unconsciousness defense. 2 '
The court did suggest that "[iun cases of the instant type
the indirect preclusion of the use of the rule to persons of
unsound mind should be eliminated."12  However, there is no
indication in the opinion whether the words "instant type" are
to be strictly construed to mean "psychomotor epilepsy," or
broadly construed so as to include other similar mental abnor-
malities. The latter view seems to be the more logical. It would
be consistent with dictum in Mosher which tends to support a
"volitional act" or free-will interpretation of the "sound mind"
requirement. The Mosher court stated that the jury should be
given an instruction on unconsciousness if "the evidence indicates
that defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense for
reasons outside his control .... "' This appropriately stres-
ses the volitional element rather than the requirement that the
defendant have a "sound mind" as defined by medical standards.
Similarly, in People v. Sedeno,1"7 the court's discussion of
unconsciousness implied that the defense should be allowed in
those cases where the unconsciousness cannot be deemed voli-
tional.
The practitioner would be well advised to keep in mind the
broad interpretation of Williams, since by arguing that "sound
mind" actually means the unconsciousness in question was not
124. Id. at 54, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. 1 Cal. 3d 379, 391, 461 P.2d 659, 666, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386 (1969)(emphasis added).
127. 10 Cal. 3d 703, 717, 518 P.2d 913, 922, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1974).
[Vol. 15
DIMINISHED CAPACITY
caused by any exercise of free will on the defendant's part, the
defense attorney may be able to have the total defense of uncon-
sciousness applied in cases where a narrower reading of the
"sound mind" limitation might preclude such a defense.' 28 If
this position is successfully maintained, then the unconsciousness
defense is not only compatible with the diminished capacity
defense, it turns on exactly the same kind of evidence. Once the
"sound mind" requirement is practically eliminated from the
unconsciousness defense, the jury need only determine the sever-
ity of the defendant's diminished capacity. If it finds impairment
amounting to unconsciousness, through no volitional act, the
defendant would escape liability entirely. If it found less serious
impairment, defendant would have the benefit of the partial
defense of diminished capacity. 12 9
The key to a successful defense based on mental condition
may well be taking extreme care in using the words "sane" or
"insane," "soundness of mind,' ''mental illness or defect," and
"abnormality." For example, in Williams the trial court in-
structed the jury that for purposes of the guilt phase, they should
presume that the defendant was of sound mind. 130 In retro-
spect it is clear that jurors could easily have misconstrued such
an instruction as suggesting that the defendant must be con-
sidered of sound mind for purposes of the unconsciousness
defense, or they could have reasoned that they were to presume
soundness of mind in the face of evidence indicating diminished
capacity sufficient to negate intent to kill.1" 1
128. In light of Williams, when it is desirable to present both a (severe) dimin-
ished capacity defense and an unconsciousness defense, the following is a sug-
gested approach: (1) present evidence indicating that the defendant's mental ill-
ness or mental defect arises from some medically explicable source (i.e., brain
damage or an abnormal condition which can be scientifically verified); (2) empha-
sizing this medical evidence, argue that the case at hand is the type referred to
in Williams; (3) argue that the case is the type contemplated in CALJIC No. 4.30
(1974) by the phrase "and other cases in which there is no functioning of the con-
scious mind"; (4) argue that "sound mind" is merely a qualifier (indicating that the
condition causing unconsciousness arose through no exercise of free will on the de-
fendant's part) and thus is intended simply to distinguish the defense of uncon-
sciousness from the defenses of insanity and unconsciousness due to voluntary in-
toxication; (5) point out that recent cases have indicated the defenses of
diminished capacity and unconsciousness are not incompatible; and, (6) stress that
the defendant's unconsciousness at the time of the offense was the result of causes
outside his control and did not involve volition.
129. See note 4 supra.
130. 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 51, 99 Cal. Rptr. 103, 116 (1971).
131. For example, as pointed out in Williams, conflict can arise when the pre-
sumption of sanity is phrased in terms of "sound mind," and is followed by the
instruction on intent, which also refers to "sound mind," but in a completely dif-
ferent context and for different purposes. Consider the possible conflict when
CAUIC No. 3.34 (1974) is given:
The intent with which an act is done is shown by the circumstances at-
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Despite difficulties created by imprecise and poorly defined
terms, however, the basic compatibility of the diminished capac-
ity and unconsciousness defenses seems clear. As the court
stated in People v. Newton, "the defenses of diminished capacity
and unconsciousness [are] entirely separate, and neither incom-
patible nor mutually exclusive .... "I"
Of course, in cases where the evidence of diminished capacity
only raises the question of whether a defendant could entertain
the specific intent for first degree murder, or the malice afore-
thought required for either first or second degree murder, problems
of compatibility are not generally presented. However, in those
cases where the defendant's diminished capacity is severe enough
to negate the intent to kill required for voluntary manslaughter,
the question of compatibility with the insanity and unconscious-
ness defenses will almost always arise. Williams being such a
case, the court felt compelled to indicate that the concepts should
be clearly distinguished, but that there is no incompatibility
among the defenses of unconsciousness, diminished capacity, and
insanity. The Williams court found the issues and evidence
presented with respect to the three defenses to be so compatible
that it recommended the bifurcated trial procedure be set aside on
retrial, and that all of these issues be presented at the guilt
phase.1 3  Similarly, courts have suggested that a defense based
on unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication is not incom-
patible with the above trilogy.' 34
2. When does diminished capacity negate intent to kill: the
Long-Ray defenses. Resolving the problem of possible incom-
patibility among the defenses of unconsciousness, insanity and
diminished capacity due to mental illness, defect, or intoxi-
cation, in no way marks out the parameters of these defenses.
The initial problem posed by Ray must remain unanswered at
this point. There is no clear-cut set of rules for applying the
tending the act, the manner in which it is done, the means used, and
the soundness of mind and discretion of the person committing the act.(Emphasis added). Here, "soundness of mind" refers to possible diminished ca-
pacity, and the presumption of sanity is not meant to affect the jury's consideration
of that issue. In People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 729, 336 P.2d 492, 500(1959), citing People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 568-69, 268 P.2d 705, 716 (1954),
the court commented:
"Sound mind" and "legal sanity" are not synonymous .... "Sound-
ness" of mind is defined as free from flaw, defect or decay, perfect ofthe kind; undamaged or unimpaired; healthy, not diseased or injured, ro-
bust. . ..
132. 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 379, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 407 (1970).
133. See note 37 supra.
134. See People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 391, 461 P.2d 659, 666, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 386 (1969).
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Long-Ray defenses. However, through a process of elimination,
one can reasonably predict when mental illness, defect or in-
toxication might rise to such a level as to negate intent
to kill. The Long-Ray defenses should be used when the
practitioner is confronted with a fact situation where the defend-
ant approaches legal insanity but will probably be found legally
sane; and where the defendant has acted in a manner, short of
unconsciousness, which might arguably negate the requisite
intent to kill for murder or voluntary manslaughter.
If nothing else, use of the Long-Ray defenses does give the
jury a viable alternative: rather than convicting a defendant of
a more serious crime, such as voluntary manslaughter or murder,
or freeing him entirely of criminal responsibility by finding
unconsciousness or insanity, the jury may opt for non-statutory
involuntary manslaughter. This clearly affords the jury, if not
the defendant, a middle ground.
D. Diminished Capacity and Insanity-Conclusion:
The Long-Ray defenses, diminished capacity which negates
intent to kill, are based upon testimony so similar to that in the
insanity phase of a bifurcated proceeding'35 that stipulating to
trying guilt and sanity together could prove beneficial to all par-
ties involved. Certainly, evidence which shows that a defendant
does not have the mental capacity to entertain intent to kill,
particularly when it indicates impairment approaching a state of
unconsciousness (unawareness), must also approach a showing of
legal insanity.
The Long-Ray defenses provide the necessary mitigation so
often called for by critics of the M'Naughten test. Furthermore,
medical-psychiatric testimony which formerly would not have
been admissible on the issue of guilt can be introduced at the
guilt phase for the purpose of negating intent to kill, as well as
at the sanity phase. Since there are few strictly legal standards
which clearly delineate the gray area between severe diminished
capacity, unconsciousness, and insanity, the practitioner must
rely on expert testimony-based on medical-psychiatric prem-
ises-to try to clarify which defense or combination of defenses
applies to the defendant in question. To some extent, the expan-
sion of diminished capacity to its present state must please those
critics of M'Naughten who have longed for a medical-psychiatric
test of insanity.
Although the expansion of the diminished capacity defense
may be well-received by defense practitioners and critics of the
135. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1970).
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harshness of M'Naughten, it is a poor substitute for a well con-
ceived medical-legal dispositional system. As the requisite ele-
ments of the several types of homicide are negated by a showing
of impaired mental condition, the severity of potential punish-
ment is mitigated. Reducing what otherwise would be first
degree murder to involuntary manslaughter also reduces the
possible period of incarceration,"6 but in no way guarantees
that the condition which gave rise to diminished capacity will
be treated. Should the authorities find that the defendant, after
-incarceration, is a danger to himself and society, civil commit-
ment proceedings can be commenced. But when such a defend-
ant is neither treated nor civilly committed, what assurance does
society have that the defendant's condition is such that he will
not again commit a violent crime? Whenever a defendant's sen-
tence is mitigated through successful invocation of the dimin-
ished capacity defense, treatment-when medically possible-
should be a prerequisite to release.
Phillip M. Adleson
136. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 190, 190.1, 190.2 (West Supp. 1975) provide thedeath penalty for first degree murder when "special circumstances" have beenproved. In other cases of first degree murder, the guilty person "shall suffer con-
finement in the state prison for life." Every person guilty of murder in the sec-
ond degree is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison from five years tolife. CAL. PEN. CODE § 193 (West 1970) provides that manslaughter is punish-
able by "imprisonment in the state prison for not exceeding 15 years [excluding
vehicular manslaughters]." See id. §§ 18, 18b (West 1970) for minimum and
alternate sentences.
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